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Abstract--The behavioral postulates of the approach are (i) firms do not know their 
demand functions, (ii) firms price according to average cost plus markup, and (iii) firms 
satisfice in the sense that a firm will not seek a higher eturn if its per unit return exceeds 
the average cost plus the minimum markup. By a behavioral equilibrium we mean the 
existence of price and quantity vectors uch that at these prices demand equals supply 
and also that prices equal markup costs plus possibly a nonnegative spread vector. We 
formulate a biextremal principle for a behavioral equilibrium under two basic assump- 
tions: (A1) demand is obtained from a strictly concave potential function of all prices, and 
(A2) each firm's average cost function is increasing. The saddle function consists of 
consumer surplus plus a new variation of producer's urplus, termed producer's 
satisficing surplus, where now the integral of marginal cost is replaced by the integral of 
markup cost. Any saddle point is a behavioral equilibrium, and we show that the 
biextremal principle is equivalent to a dual pair of uniextremal principles governed 
basically by price variables and quantity variables, respectively. We offer a new 
behavioral interpretation by showing (a) in the market demand (price) problem one 
minimizes the sum of consumer surplus and producers' markup surplus, and (b) in the 
producers' (quantity) problem one maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and the 
producers' satisficing surplus. 
1. INTRODUCTION:  A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO EQUIL IBR IUM 
Recently, Pfouts [1] developed a theory of the firm to explain how firms actually make 
price and output decisions. The basic postulates of this approach are (i) firms do not 
know their demand functions, (ii) firms price according to average cost plus a markup, 
and (iii) firms satisfice in the sense that a firm will not seek a higher return if its per unit 
return exceeds the average cost plus the minimum markup. In this setting a behavioral 
equilibrium is characterized by the existence of price and quantity vectors such that at 
these prices consumer demand equals supply and that prices equal markup costs plus a 
nonnegative spread vector. 
In the conventional equilibrium theory [1], there is usually a uniquely determined 
equilibrium point, where the property of uniqueness is particularly important for stability 
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analysis. In contrast, nonuniqueness of behavioral equilibria is an essential ingredient of 
our approach. Noncompetitive firms, for example, will be willing to tolerate changes in 
the quantity that they sell without making price adjustments. Price (or nonprice com- 
petition) may not evoke a price change unless of course a firm finds that it is no longer 
receiving an acceptable markup. Consequently, a distribution of prices over firms may 
occur even for perfect substitutes rather than simply a single equilibrium price. 
Similarly, cost changes will not evoke a price change unless they result in the firm failing 
to obtain the acceptable markup. 
The theory is illustrated for a single firm in Fig. 1. Here V(q) is the average cost of 
production plus the acceptable markup. The demand is represented by D(q), while lff is 
the price established by the firm. The broken line shows the spread s between the actual 
price,/~, and acceptable price at that level of output. As long as s is nonnegative, the firm 
will accept he return and will be in equilibrium. 
In this paper, we formulate a minimax (biextremal) principle for a behavioral equili- 
brium and establish a saddle point under two basic assumptions: (A1) consumer demand 
(although unknown to the firms) is obtained by differentiating a strictly concave potential 
function of all prices and (A2) there are n firms and each firm's average cost function is 
increasing. Any saddle point is necessarily a behavioral equilibrium. Among the terms of 
the saddle function itself are a measure of consumer surplus and a new varfation of 
producer's urplus, termed producer's atisficing surplus, where now the integral of 
marginal cost is replaced by the integral of markup cos.t. 
Building on results of Refs. [3], [411 [5], and [6], we show that the biextremal principle 
is equivalent to a dual pair of uniextremal principles each of which is a separably infinite 
linear program [3]. We term one of these programs the consumer demand principle for 
its variables are all the prices plus generalized finite sequences associated with the 
producers' markup plus spread cost functions. The dual program is termed the 
producer's principle for its variables are all of the output quantities of the firms plus 
generalized finite sequences associated with the consumer demand's trictly concave 
potential function. 
The existence of this duality provides two potential benefits. When there are dis- 




Fig. 1. Illustration ofthe behavioral model of the firm. 
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provides an operational method for reaching equilibrium. Second, sensitivity analysis 
and complementary slackness between the dual pair of programs provide a duality 
theoretic approach to questions of price stability of equilibrium. 
2. FORMULATION OF THE POSTULATES AND DEFIN IT ION 
OF BEHAVIORAL EQUIL IBRIUM 
We assume that there are n number of goods and n firms with firm i producing ood i 
and only good i, i = 1 . . .  n. There is in the overall market a set of aggregate demand 
functions for each of these n goods which we shall term the consumer  demand 
funct ions ,  
x i=x i (p l . . .p , ,M)  i=  l . . .m,  (1) 
where p~ is the price of good i and M is the disposable income of the market, i.e., what 
the market has to spend on the n goods. While the demand functions exist, it is assumed 
that they are unknown in toto to each of the producing firms. Of course, in an 
operational way firms do observe how much quantity will sell at various prices, and firms 
conceivably could perform market studies to acquire information about the consumer 
demand functions. At this stage of development, however, we shall treat these issues of 
information retrieval as interpretations of the duality to be set forth later on. 
We assume that there exists a strictly concave function in nonnegative prices p = 
(P~)~=I, E(p ,  M)  which is essential ly smooth ,  see Ref. [7], Chap. 26. This means that E is 
differentiable at all price lists having no zero component and that if a sequence of prices 
converges to a price list having at least one zero component, hen the gradient of E with 
respect o p converges to +oo in norm. We shall further assume that consumer demand is 
generated by E in the sense that 
i.e., 
aE 
- -  = xi(p) i = l . . . n, 
api 
VE(p)=x(p) fo rp i>0,  i= l . . .n ,  (2) 
where for convenience we suppress the M notation since M is fixed in our analysis. One 
of the main advantages of the strict concavity assumption is that various kinds of 
uniqueness properties prevail under relevant optimizations. Essential smoothness 
reflects the property that as the price of a good goes to zero (ceteris par ibus) ,  its demand 
becomes arbitrarily large. It is a condition which together with strict concavity, yields 
invertibility of the gradient VE on the set of positive prices. This will facilitate making 
economic interpretations in a later section. 
At this point, we simply remark that any of a variety of demand functions could be 
chosen for this analysis. For example, any of those consistent with neoclassical con- 
sumer behavior which are based on either indirect utility functions or expenditure 
functions could be employed (see for example, [8]). 
A simple cost structure is assumed for each firm. Average cost to firm i of producing 
output quantity ql of good i given constant factor prices w, Ai(qi, w),  is assumed to be of 
its usual U-shaped or J-shaped form. Specifically, we assume that there is a quantity qmi. 
rnin such that average cost is at a minimum and that (a) for 0 < q i -  qi , A~(. ) is decreasing 
[A~(. )<0]  and (b) for q~-> q~", A~(. ) is increasing [A~(. )>0] .  In this paper, however, 
we shall restrict ourselves to the subregion {q~lq~ >- q~"}- 
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We shall also assume that there is a short run upper bound on actual production of 
each firm, 
qi -< ql "ax for i = 1, 2 . . .  n. (3) 
Capacity expansion designed for long-run considerations would be required if output 
were desired above these upper bounds. For convenience we shall omit the w notation. 
By mark-up costs, we simply mean the cost functions V~ given by 
Vi(qi) = A~(qi)(l + Oi), (4) 
where 0~-0  are termed the markups. A vector of nonnegative numbers s shall be 
specified in advance and termed the spread between prices and markup costs, i.e., 
p~ = s~ + V i (q3 .  (5) 
Under these assumptions a pair of vectors p*, q* of prices and quantities, respectively, 
is termed a behavioral equilibrium with respect o a spread vector s if and only if 
(P1) at prices p* the demand for good i equals its supply q*, and 
(P2) prices equal markup costs plus spread, i.e., 
P* = Si Jr" Vi(q~) for i = 1, 2 . . .  n. 
Since of course the nonnegative spread vector acts as a set of spacing or slack 
variables, (P2) simply states that firm i satisfices rather than optimizes. In general, we say 
that a firm satisfices if and only if p* >_ V~(q*). 
min For q~-  qi , V~(. ) is monotonically increasing, and hence has an inverse, denoted 
vTl( • ). 
3. A B IEXTREMAL FORMULATION FOR THE 
BEHAVIORAL EQUIL IBR IUM 
In our development we shall use two basic assumptions which we term global 
substitutabil ity conditions illustrated in Fig. 2. 
There exists pmi.< Vi(q?i.) and pmaX> Vi(q?ax) for i = l, 2 . . .  n, such that 
min (6a) xi(p) = qmaX can occur for some p,  pmin < p __< pmaX only if p~ = Pi , 
and 
xi(p) = qmi, can occur for some p,  pmin___ p _<< pmaX only if pi = pmax. (6B) 
The idea is to construct a saddle function K(p,  q), defined for p ~ P, q E Q which is 
convex in p for each fixed q and which is concave in q for each fixed p, where P and Q 
are the following convex polyhedra: 
p=((p ,  p . ) f  m~°< ma. . 
• .. Pi --Pi<--Pi , i= l ,  . .n}  (7A) 
• max Q={(q , . . .q , ) Iq~' "  ~q,  ~q i  , i= l . . .n} .  (7B) 
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Price, Cost 
P i  
. . . . .  " 
, max  
Vi tqi ) 
rain 
Vl(q i ) pmin 
Fig. 2. Illustration of global substitutability assumptions. 
qmaX qi 
Basically K(p,  q) will be the sum of convex and concave functions with a bilinear 
term 
pq = ~, Plqi. 
i - I  
By assumption E ( .  ) is strictly concave and hence -E ( .  ) is strictly convex in prices. 
Moreover,  the integral of the markup cost curve, 
qi 
f Vi(t) dt, (8) 
0 
is strictly convex over the range qmin__ q~ __ qmaX because its second derivative V~( • ) is 
positive. Hence, for a given spread vector s -> 0, the saddle function, 
qi 
K~(p, q) = -E (p l  • • • p,) + ,.., Piqi siqi Vi(t) dt, (9) 
i=!  i= l  i=1 
0 
is convex in p and concave in q. Due to our assumptions about behavior in the short 
run, the convex constraint sets P and Q are both bounded, and hence it is standard 
knowledge that Ks(p, q) has a saddle point (p*, q*) which is a solution to 
vs = min max [Ks(p, q)] = max min [Ks(p, q)] 
pEP qEQ qEQ p~P 
(10) 
(see, for example, [7] Chap. 37, or [9]). We summarize as follows. 
578 KENNETH O. KORTANEK AND RALPH W.  PFOUTS 
THEOREM 1. For any demand and cost specification of Sec. 2 and nonnegative spread 
vector s, there exists a saddle point p*, q*, with vs = Ks(p*, q*). 
Parenthetically, we note that the willingness of the firm to provide supply is limited by 
V~( • ). Thus, as the demand curve moves upward to the right in Fig. 2, the willingness to 
supply increases up to q~ . . . .  a point of stationarity. This behavioral characteristic, which 
has often been noted in markets, means that V~( • ) is the gradient of a concave potential 
as is shown in (9). Hence an often observed aspect of market behavior is identical to a 
significant characteristic of a saddle function. 
Corollary 1. Assume that with respect o a saddle point p*, q* none of the bounds for 
prices nor for quantities, (7A) and (7B), respectively, are satisfied as equalities. Then p *, q* 
is a behavioral equilibrium. 
Proof. Being restricted away from the price and boundary upper bounds permits the 
usual differential stationarity optimality conditions to hold. Hence, keeping p* fixed and 
differentiating the saddle function with respect o q and setting the derivative qual to 
zero yields 
p*  - sl - V i (q* )  = O, 
which is (P2). Similarly, from q* being fixed we derive the stationarity condition with 
respect o p, namely, 
which is (P1). 
-aE I  +q*=0 i= l . . .n ,  
c3pi p, 
In the next section we shall establish behavioral equilibrium without he assumption of 
Corollary 1. 
4. EQUIVALENT DUAL PAIR OF UNIEXTREMAL PROBLEMS 
The underlying tools used to obtain linearizations of the saddle value problems are the 
differential supporting hyperplane representations of (a) the epigraph of the strictly 
convex function -E(p~.. .  pn) over the set of prices P of (7A), and (b) the hypograph of 
the strictly concave function 
qi 
siqi Vi(t) dt 
i=1 i=1 
0 
over the set of quantities Q of (7B). The respective linear inequality systems are the 
following: (P0, P) E R × R" satisfying 
n 
po+ ~ p,x,(v) - -E(v) + ~ v,x,(v) 
i=l i= l  
(11) 
for all y ~ P, and (qo, q) E R x R n satisfying 
o" i
i= l  i=1 
0 
n 
Vi(t) d t+ ~ (riVi(oq) (12) 
i= l  
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for all (gl, 0,2... or,) E Q. Now P and Q are compact sets and all derivatives exist since 
prices are constrained to be positive. Furthermore, since each linear inequality system 
(l l) and (12) can be satisfied strictly for some points, it follows that each system is 
canonically closed [10]. This implies that the associated moment cones, required in the 
construction and duality of [4] (which we now follow), are in fact closed. 
In the consumer demand problem to follow the price variables are augmented by 
additional variables which are actually special functions termed generalized finite 
sequences. In general, if T is any set, then the generalized finite sequence space of T is 
the linear space of all real valued functions over T having only finitely many nonzero 
functional values. If h( • ) is a generalized finite sequence and say H(  • ) is any function 
on T, then 
shall mean the finite sum 
~, H(t )X( t )  
tET 
~, H(t )X( t ) ,  
t Esupp(h) 
where 
supp(X) = {t ~ TlX(t) # 0}. (13) 
Generalized finite sequences shall also be employed in the producers' problem. It will be 
convenient to denote this linear space by R ~T). 
I. Producers' Problem: Find 
max 2 rain t v~(s)=sup(qo)+ ~, {-E(3')+3'x(v)}X(V)- p~ u~+ Pi ui 
7EP i=1 i=1 
(14) 
from among (qo, q) E R x R", u, u' E R", and h(- ) E R ~P) satisfying 
q. + ~ qi(si + Vi(m)) ~ - Vi(t) dt + mVi(m), all ~ E Q 
i= l  i=1 i=l  
0 
(15) 
tm -q l  + ~ x~(v)x(v) - u~ + u~-  0 
'yEP 
(16) 
x(v)  = 1 
3'EP 
(17) 
qi ~ q max (18a) 
and 
-q i -<-q~"  i= l . . .n  
u'->0, u->0 and X( - ) -0 .  
(18b) 
(19) 
II. Consumer Demand Problem: Find 
o, i
"{f } VI I (S )  = in f (p0)  + ~e ~ - Vi ( t )  dt + o'iVi(o'i) '~(o') + qtfLaxl~ i rain t -- qi vi '= i= l  i=1 
0 
(20) 
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from among (P0, P) E R x R"; v, v' E R"; and ~( • ) E R ~°) satisfying 
" 2 Po + ~ pix~(~,) >--E('y) + ~,~x~(y), all ~, E P 
i=1 i=l 
and 




~] "O(cr)= 1 (23) 
~EQ 
THEOREM 2. 
_p~ __ _p max 
min Pi---Pl , i=  1,2 . . . .  n 
(24a) 
(24b) 
v'->0, v ->0and ~( . ) ->0.  (25) 
Let the assumptions of Secs. 2 and 3 prevail: E strictly concave in prices 
p, Vi increasing in quantity qi, i = 1 . . .  n, with P, Q being the convex polytopes (7A) and 
(7B). Then the producers' problem I has an optimal solution: 
ql 
s iq* -~ f V,(t)dt, u*ER" ,u ' *~R" ,X* ( ' )ER  (P), q*~ Q, q*=-  
0 
and the consumer demand problem II has an optimal solution: 
p* E P, P0* = -E(p*) ,  v* ~ R", v'* E R", rl*(" ) E R ~°), 
and for any such dual pair of solutions p*, q* is a saddle point of the convex-concave 
saddle function K,(p, q). 
Proof. The existence of a dual pair of optimal solutions such that p*, q* is a 
saddle-point of K,(p, q) is a direct application of Theorem 3 of[4]. The recession cone 
conditions (i) and (ii) there are trivially satisfied because P and Q are bounded sets and 
so each recession cone 0+P and 0+Q, respectively, is {0}. 
Corollary 2. Let {q*, q*, u*, h*} be optimal for the producers' problem I and {p*, 
p*, v*, rl*} be optimal for the consumer demand problem II. Then 
{1; ~/=p* and "0*(cr)=~'l;cr=q* h*(3') = 0; 3~# p* [0; o'# q*" 
Proof. We work on problem II since the argument for I is similar. Let (p*, p*, v*, ~*) 
be II-optimal, so that clearly P0* = -E(p*) .  
By complementary slackness, Corollary 1.2 [4], h*(</)> 0 implies that (21) is satisfied 
as an equality for ~ E P, i.e., 
-E (p*)  = -E (~)  - VE(q)(p* - "~) and p* ~ P. (26) 
But of course we know for any p->0, each pi#O that (p,-E(p))~epi(-E),  and so it 
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follows that 
-E (p )  - -E(~/) - VE(~)(p - ~). (27) 
Substituting (26) into (27) yields 
-E (p )  >- -E(p*)  -VE(~/)(p - p*) 
which says that -VE(~) is a subgradient of -E  at p* and hence 
VE(p*) = VE(~). 
Since E is strictly concave, it follows that the gradient mapping is 1-1 and hence p* = q. 
This shows that either )t*(~/) = 0 or if X*(V) > 0, then the entire unit mass must be and is 
assigned to the point p* E P. Q.E.D. 
Theroem 3. Assume that the spread vector s is 0. Let {q*, q*, u*, u'*, h*(. )} and {p*, 
p*, v*, v'*, 71"(- )} be a dual optimal pair for Programs I and II, respectively. Then p*, q* 
is a behavioral equilibrium. 
Proof. We will use the assumptions of Sees. 2 and 3 together with complementary 
slackness results. By Corollary 2, h*(. ) and "O*(" ) are single mass point measures. 
We consider the mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive cases for p*, pmin_< 
max p*-----p~ , for each i = 1 . . .  n. We shall retain the s~ parameters to see which case 
actually requires s~ = 0. 
Case 1: pmin< p, < pmax. Complementary slackness applied to (24a), (24b) implies that 
the dual variables ui, u] are zero, u* = u]* =0,  and hence q* = x~(p*), which is the 
market clearing condition. 
By (6A) it follows that x~(p*) < qmX and so q* < qmaX forcing the dual variable v* = 0. 
mill Similarly, (6B) implies that xi(p*) > q~ , and hence q* > qmi, forcing v]* = 0. Hence, (22) 
implies that satisficing has occurred. 
Case 2: p* = p~ni,. Complementary slackness applied to (24a) yields u* = 0. By (6B) 
we have xi(p*) > q~i,. Therefore, q* = xi(p*) + u~* > q~i,+ u]* >- qmi,, and by com- 
plementary slackness applied to (18b) we see that v]* = 0. 
We now show that u]* = 0 by showing otherwise that (14) can be increased by setting 
u'~* = 0 for a fixed i. At an optimum, the sum of the terms in (14) involving q* and u]*, 
but not p*, is 
qT 
f nminljt* B =-s iq* -  Vi dt +~.i -i , 
0 
using the reductions permitted by Corollary 2. If u'~* > 0, then u~* can be decreased to 0, 
defining q~ = xi(p*) which satisfies (18a) and (18b). [This is possible since q~aX___ q ,  = 
xi(p*)+ u~* and xi(p*)> q?i,.] With this change, (16) automatically holds, and q* is 
altered by the terms only involving, q~ < q*; afterwards we get 
A = -s i~t i -  f V i dt, 
0 
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and hence the difference in (14) becomes 
q7 c/~ 
B-A=-s i (q* -4 i ) - [ f  V, d t - f  Vidt]-+piminuit* 
o o 
f rain t, = -siu~* - Vi dt + pi ui . 
Applying the mean value theorem of calculus gives 
B - A = -siu~* - Vi(qi)u~* "~ lr~minl'~t* r~i --i , 
where f/i - Oi - q*. The left-most erm in B - A is negative, while the sum of the two 
right-most terms, being [p~n _ V~(O)]u[*, is also negative because p~ < V~(q~ an) < Vi(4i), 
from just above (6A). Hence B < A, and (14) is increased by this adjustment. But this 
contradicts the fact that an optimal solution to I is at hand. Therefore, u~* = 0. 
In summary, we have established in Case 2 that u* = u~*= 0 giving the market  
clearing condition (16), and we have established v~*= 0, v*-> 0, which yields satisficing 
via (22). 
Case 3: p* = p~aX. Complementary slackness applied to (24b) yields u~* = 0, while, by 
(6A), x i (p* )< qmX. Hence, it follows that 
q~ = xi(p*)-- U~ < qmax__ U~ ~ q~ax, 
which implies v ~, = 0 by (18a). Analogous to Case 2, we show that u* must be 0. Suppose 
to the contrary that u* > 0. 
At an optimum the sum of the terms in (14) involving q* but not p* is 
q~, 
f n maxln* B =-s iq* -  Vi d t -~. i  - i. 
0 
Delete the term u* to get the new quantity x* = x~(p*) which satisfies (18a) and (18b) 
[because qmin+u*<--xi(p*)<qmax ]. With this change the sum of the terms in (14) 
involving only x* > q* is then 
xT 




B - A = s i (x* -  q*) + l Vi d t -  pimaXu i*
q; 
= s~u~, + Vi(~ll)u* - p~aX u*, 
where q* --- ~i - x*. Now, by monotonicity of Vi(" ), Vi(~ll) <- Vi(x*) < Vi(q~ x) < p~aX 
from just above (6A). Hence when sl = 0, then 
p~ )u i  <0.  B - A = [Vi(c~i)- max . 
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This is a contradiction, and hence it follows that u* = 0. Note that this is the only place 
in the proof where we required the parameter s~ to be zero. 
What we have demonstrated in Case 3 is that u~*= u* =0 (establishing market 
min clearing) and that v* = 0. Now if q* > q~ , then v~* = 0, and we have satisficing. On the 
other hand, if q* = q~in, then from (6A), and monotonicity of Vi and V~-', we have 
implying 
V~-l(pmax) > q~nax ~> qmin 
rain pmaX > V i (q  i ), 
i.e., 
p~ = pmax> Vi (q~)  ' 
and we also have satisficing. Hence the treatment of Case 3 is complete. 
Corollary 2 motivates the construction of the following dual pair of nonlinear Variable 
Coefficients (VC) problems related to generalized linear programming, see [11] and [12], 
where for convenience we suppress the notation s. 
Ivc (P roducers '  P rob lem) :  Find 
qi 




x i (p  ),~ - q~ - ui <- O i = l . . . n (29) 
h=l  (30) 
and 
u - - - - -0 ,0~q~q max (31) 
and where p may be freely chosen in the set P. 
IIvc (Consumer  Demand Prob lem) :  Find 
ql 
v vc = inf - E(p)  + ~ [q,V,(q~) - V,(t) dt ] r /+ ~ qmaXl) i 




-p i+(s~+ V i (q J ) r l+v~>=O i= l . . .n  (33) 
-0=1 (34) 
v -> 0 and 0_< p ___ pm~, (35) 
and where each q may be freely chosen in the set Q. (36) 
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Corollary 2 says that any pair of dual optimal solutions to (I)-(II) is a dual optimal 
pair for the variable coefficients problems (IVC)-(IlVC). 
In the context of the second author's behavioral equilibrium theory [10] the variable 
coefficients duality pair provide more immediate conomic interpretations, which is the 
topic of the next section. 
5. ECONOMIC INTERPRETAT IONS OF THE DUALITY PR INCIPLE  
BETWEEN CONSUMER DEMAND AND THE PRODUCERS 
Since E is strictly concave and essentially smooth with respect o positive prices, the 
vector valued demand function x(p) = VE(p) is invertible. Since the inverse gives prices 
as functions of quantities, it shall be denoted by p( • ). Motivated by Theorem 3, we shall 
restrict ourselves to behavioral equilibria where (29) and (33) appear as equalities. We 
shall further assume that both x( .  ) and p( .  ) are differentiable to facilitate some line 
integral calculus for interpretations involving concepts of economic surplus [13, 14]. 
Let P0 be a fixed, positive price list in P and let p~ be arbitrary in P. Let q0 = x(po) and 
q~=x(pt).  Let q ( . )  denote a smooth curve F~ from [0, 1] to Q with q(0)= q0 and 
q(1) = q~. Then we obtain the well-defined corresponding smooth curve/3 in price space 
P by /3(0 = p(q(t)), 0-  < t--< 1. Denote this curve by F2 so that by the line integral 
calculus 
/ .  
E(p0 - E(po) = d~ VE d/3. 
F2 
(37) 
As shown in the Appendix, integrating (37) by parts and then changing variables 
yields 
/- 
- {E(p , )  - E (p0)}  = d~ p dq  - (p ,x (p , )  pox(po)} 
rl 
(38) 
Since P0 is fixed we may ignore the constants and rewrite (38) as 
f 
p dq-  px(p) (plus constant), 
FI 
(39) 
where now p has replaced p~ to indicate its free choice in the price set P. 
5.1 Interpretation of the producers" maximization problem 
Under these transformations, the objective function of the producers' variable 
coefficient problem now denoted Z(q), (28) becomes 
/ -  r 
=,  p dq- ,  (s + v)dq - pmaXu, 
Fi F 1 
(40) 
V n where V = ( i)~=1, and constants are again ignored. 
Let us assume that the short run upper bounds on prices are redundant so that the 
shadow prices u associated with these constraints, (35), are zero. In this case, the 
A behavioral theory of the firm 
function Z(p)  can be written as the sum of the following two components: 
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/- 
consumers '  surplus: ~ p dq - Pq 
Ft 
(41) 
producers' satisficing surplus: pq - ~ (s + V) dq, 
FI 
(42) 
to be interpreted in the ex ante sense. When p and q are one-dimensional these 
surpluses are illustrated in Fig. 3. 
In Fig. 3, the producer is found on the demand curve at C (and must restrict 
movements to the demand curve). Consumer surplus is the area under the demand curve 
above the line segment DC. What we have termed the producers atisficing surplus is the 
area above the markup plus spread curve segment AB and below line segment DC. 
Maximization of this total area will lead to the point of intersection of the demand curve 
and the markup plus spread curve. By maximizing this area, the firms will assure that the 
market is satisfied to the greatest extent hat is compatible with the preservation of their 
markup and spread. 
In the multigood case, (40) shows how firms will react to disequilibrium. For, from 
(40), we see that VZ = p - (s + V). Thus, for any direction v such that VZ • v ~ 0, the 
firms are asked to change quantity in order to meet demand. Since the demand equation 
is not known, this gives the producers an operational way of reaching equilibrium. 
Because firms are maximizing Z(q), they will know in which direction along v to change 
quantities. If VZ • v > 0, then they will move in a positive direction along v, say to q + av, 
a > 0. In the simple case of some price Pi being greater than markup plus spread Vi(qi) + si, 
firm i would simply increase the quantity qi of good i produced. If pj < Vj(qj) + sj, then firm j 
does the opposite by decreasing qi. Thus, the firms modify their quantities produced until 
demand is met at prices p. 







Fig. 3. Illustration of the producers' objective function: consumer surplus [parallel-hatched area] and 
producer's atisficing surplus [cross-hatched area], ex ante.  
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5.2. Interpretation of the consumers demand problem 
Let us assume that the shadow prices associated with the upper bound constraints on 
prices are zero. Then, substituting (39) into the objective function of the consumer 
demand problem now denoted W(p) yields (up to a constant) 
qi 
W(p)=~p dq-px(p)+ ~=1 [qiV,(q,)- f V,(t)dt], (43, 
F 0 
where p = s + V(q) according to (33). The left-most difference in (43) is consumer 
surplus, just as occurred in the producers objective function, see (41). The right-most 
term in (43) is different from its producer counterpart (42), and we shall simply call this 
term the markup surplus, i.e., 
ql 
markup surplus for q = ~ q,V,(q,) - [ V~(t) dr. (44) 
i=l J 
0 
As before, these surpluses are to be interpreted in the ex ante sense. In the one- 
dimensional case the geometrical interpretation is given in Fig. 4. In Fig. 4, the consumer 
demand is at the point A on the producers markup plus spread, and movement is 
constrained to remain on this curve. Minimizations of this total area will lead to the point of 
intersection of the demand curve and the markup plus spread curve. 
To examine consumer demand reactions to points of disequilibrium, let us return to 
the multigood case and express the markup surplus in terms of prices by a change of 
variables. 
For si -> 0, let Vs~(qi) = si + Vi(qi) for qi -> 0. Vs,(. ) is increasing by assumption and 
hence a unique inverse v~,l( • ) exists, and V~, I is differentiable. Thus, we may integrate 
by parts and change variables qi = V~I(Pl), 
qi qi Pi 
¢ V:'(p,)dp,. 
0 0 0 
/s+V(q)  
P J /V (q)  
, 
P(q) 
Fig. 4. Illustration of the consumer demand and objective function: consumer surplus [parallel-hatched area] 
and producers' markup surplus [cross-hatched area], ex ante. 
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Assume that the shadow prices v are zero so that then via (39) and (43): 
Pl 




VW(p)=-x i (p)+V~(pi )  i= l . . .n  
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=-x i (p )+q l  i= l . . .n  (45) 
Now since at price vector p, x(p) is the vector of demands while q is an output vector, 
(45) yields a vector of positive or negative xcess demands. 
The minimization of W(p) tells consumer demand to remove all excess demands by 
appropriate changes in price. If a good has positive excess demand x~(p)> q~, then the 
correct action is taken by increasing p~ in order to obtain a decrease in W(p). Similarly, 
with a negative excess demand xi(p)< qi, the goal of minimizing W(p) tells us to 
decrease the price p~ of good i. More generally, if there is a direction v such that 
VW(p) • v~ 0, appropriate price changes along v can be taken to decrease W(p). Thus, 
minimization of W(p) instructs the consumer to see that demand is satisfied to the 
maximum extent hat producers are willing to satisfy demand, but not to the extent hat 
the quantity offered is so great hat it will not be purchased. 
Our final section studies the effects on prices due to departures from equilibrium. 
6. PRICE STABILITY UNDER DEPARTURES FROM 
BEHAVIORAL EQUILIBRIUM 
We now examine whether prices necessarily change when the demand functions hift 
or when average cost functions change. A key to our biextremal formulations i the 
sensitivity role played by the spread vector s, which is merely a spacing vector of 
parameters giving the difference between what producers would be willing to accept as 
prices (markup costs) and what they actually can receive in the market. Demand and 
cost changes generally change the amount of spread which producers realize, but they 
permit ranges of quantity outputs for which producers atisfice at unchanged prices. The 
following price stability result specifies quantity ranges stemming from proportional 
demand changes and proportional verage cost changes. 
THEOREM 3. Let s denote a fixed nonnegative spread vector with associated ual pair 
of variable coefficient problems Ivc and IIvc [(28)-(35)] having optimal solutions denoted 
by qS and p~, respectively. Assume that the demand potential function changes to 
= aE (demand changing from VE to aVE), a > 0 and that the markup cost functions 
change to Qi --/3iVy, /3~ > 0, i = 1. . .  n. Assume that the upper bound price and quantity 
constraints (31) and (35) are redundant ("in the short run") for any choice of nonnegative 
spread vector for the new demand and cost functions. Then there exists a nonnegative 
spread vector g such that p' is an optimal price vector with respect o g if and only if 
p~ >- [3iVi(aq~) i = 1 . . .  n. (46) 
Proof. Inequality (46) is equivalent to the spread defined by g~ = p~-  [3iVi(aq~) being 
nonnegative. Since (31) and (35) are assumed redundant, he spread g is associated with 
the following instances of programs Ivc and IIvc, where demand cost are changed 
according to the assumptions of Theorem 3. 
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qi 
r z z f 
0 
18iVi(t) dt + pax(p)  - aE(p)  (47) 
ax i (p ) ) t -q i=0 i= l . . .n  (48a) 
;~=1 (48b) 
where p is freely chosen in P and q -> 0. (49) 
VC II~ : Find 
subject o 
qi 




-p~ + [g~ + ~8iV~(qi)]n = 0 (5 la) 
n = 1 (51b) 
where q is freely chosen in Q and p -> 0. (52) 
We specify two feasible vectors for I vc and II vc and show that their objective values 
agree, thereby proving each is optimal for its respective programs. 
For I vc set q~ = aq ~, )~ = 1 [with p~ = p~ being the freely chosen price in (49)], while 
for II vc set p~= pS [with q~= aq ~ being the freely chosen quantity vector in (52)]. 
Clearly (48) establishes q~ as feasible for I vc, while (51) establishes p ~ as feasible for II vc 
by using the definition of g and also the choice of aq ~ in (52). 
Let IVC(q~), IlVC(p ~) denote the respective objective function values of these two 





= "~i a/3iq~V/(aq~) - "~i f /3y/(t) dt - aE(p') .  (53) 
0 
On the other hand, 
IlVC(p ~) = -aE(p  ~) + ~ ~Siq~Vi(aq~) - f f31Vi(t) dt, 
0 
(54) 
and we see that IVC(q s) = IlVC(ps), proving optimality. Clearly, the steps may be reversed 
to establish that if p s is an optimal price vector, then g is established by (51) as well as 
q ~ via (48), in particular (46) must hold. 
Changes due solely to costs or due solely to demand shifts are special cases of 
Theorem 3. 
A behavioral theory of the firm 589 
Acknowledgement--The research of K. O. Kortanek was partially supported by the National Science 
Foundation Grant ECS-8026777 with Carnegie-Mellon University. This revision has benefited from comments by 
Professor Sten Thore. 
REFERENCES 
1. R. W. Pfouts, A theory of firm and industry based on empirical evidence, Department of Economics, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (1980). 
2. K. J. Arrow and F. H. Hahn, General Competitive Analysis, Holden-Day, San Francisco, 1971. 
3. A. Charnes, P. R. Gribik, and K. O. Kortanek, Separably-infinite programs. Z. Op. Res. 24, 34-45 (1980). 
4. A. Charnes, P. R. Gribik, and K. O. Kortanek, Polyextremal principles and separably-infinite programs. Z. 
Op. Res. 25, 211-234 (1980). 
5. A. Charnes, K. O. Kortanek, and S. Thore, An infinite constrained game duality characterizing economic 
equilibrium, Research Report CCS 386, Center for Cybernetic Studies, Austin, TX (1980); Revised (1981). 
6. S. Thore, Disequilibrium in the private ownership economy as a saddle point. Discussion Draft No. l, The 
Institute for Constructive Capitalism, Austin, TX (1979). 
7. R. T. Rockafeller, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (1970). 
8. K. A. Small and H. S. Rosen, Applied welfare economics with discrete choice-models. Econometrica 49, 
105-130 (1981). 
9. M. Sion, On general minimax theorems. Pac. J. Math. 8, 171-176 (1958). 
10. K. Glashoff, Duality theory of semi-infinite programming, in Semi-lnlinite Programming, R. Hettich, ed.; 
Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, A. V. Balakrishnan and M. Thomas, eds., Springer- 
Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York (1979). 
I 1. G. B. Dantzig, Linear Programming and Extensions, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (1964). 
12. K. O~ Kortanek, Perfect duality in generalized linear programming, in Survey of Mathematical Program- 
ming, Proc. 9th Inter. Math Prog. Symp., A. Prekopa, ed., Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, pp. 
43-58 (1979). 
13. H. Hotelling, The general welfare in relation to the problem of taxation and of railway and utility rates. 
Econometrica 6,242-269 (1938). 
14. M. Carey, A reformulation of generalized benefit maximizing models, Series A. Report No. 206, Dept. 
Indus. Econ. and Bus. Studies, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, England (1976). 
APPENDIX:  INTEGRATION BY PARTS 
AND CHANGE OF  VARIABLES IN L INE  INTEGRALS 
The basic assumpt ion  is that E is strictly concave and essential ly smooth with respect o 
posit ive prices. This implies that x( • ) --- VE( • ) has a unique inverse denoted p( • ), since 
the images will be prices. We assume further that p( • ) is differentiable. 
Let  P0 be a fixed posit ive price list in P and let p~ be an arbitrary posit ive price list in P. 
Let  q0 = x(po) and q~ = x(p ~) both in Q. Let  q( • ) denote a smooth curve F 1 in Q, q: [0, 1] ~ Q 
with q(0) = q0 and q(1) = qt. Then by means of p( • ) we obtain a curve F2 in price space by 
the composite map/3( t )  = p(q(t)). Let F(t)  = E(p(q(t)))  so that 
n 3E ~ 3pk 
F'(t) = ~-'=t ~ (p(q(t))) i=t-~i (q(t))q;(t) = VE(p(q(t)))  d[3. 
Hence 
f F'(t) dt = ~ VE d/3, 




E(p,) - E(po) = F(1) - F(0)  = ~b E d[3, 
F2 
(2) 
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where Po = P(qo) and Pl = P(qO. Integrating (1) by parts gives 
1 
1'o E(p,) -  E(po) = pk(q(t))xk(p(q(t))) - pk(q(t)) dxk(p(q(t))) k=l 
0 
= ~ [pk(q(1))xk(p(q(1)))--pk(q(O))xk(p(q(O)))] 
k=l 
I 
- ~_~ pk(q(t)) ~_j O~X---~k(p(q(t)))~ coplk=, t=, ap~ J=, ~ (q(t))q',(t) dt 
0 
! 




7p~ (p(q(t))) ~ (q(t)) 
j=l  
l 
= p,x(p,) - pox(po) - ~_~ f pk(q(t))q'~(t) dt, 
k=l 
0 
since the double sum in the bracketed term is the Dirac 8k~ function. Hence, in summary, 
t"  
E(pO-  E(po) = p~x(pO- pox(po)- dq. P 
Ft 
